Before Ibn Saud could unite Arabia, he first had to face his greatest rival: the Rashidis of Jebel Shammar. For decades, they held sway over Najd, backed by the Ottomans and feared by their neighbors. The struggle between Ibn Saud and Ibn Rashid was more than a fight for cities and tribes; it was a battle for control of the Arabian Peninsula. It was a battle to decide who would shape the future of Arabia.

Ibn Rashid and Ibn Saud; two men so different, yet destined to clash. Each carried the legacy of a ruling family, but only one would rise to dominate Arabia.

The Rashidis had their moment. In the late 19th century, the House of Saud lost control of Najd. Even Riyadh, their capital, fell. In 1881, Ibn Rashid entered the city disguised as a Turkish lieutenant; a show of loyalty to the Ottomans, who backed him. By 1891, both Saud and Rashid were lobbying the Ottomans for favor. The Rashidis were favored, but their story was never destined to last. Another dynasty was already waiting to take their place.

At the dawn of the 20th century, Ibn Saud began consolidating his power. A significant turning point came in 1901 when he recaptured Riyadh in a surprise attack. With that, he reclaimed the city his family had lost years before. In 1903, the Ottoman representative acknowledged Ibn Saud as governor of Central Arabia. But recognition on paper did not end the rivalry. In 1906, Ibn Saud crushed Rashidi forces in Qasim. This was the first sign that the balance of power in Central Arabia was shifting. But for Ibn Saud, greater battles still lay ahead.

The Ottomans tried to hedge their bets, supporting both men. According to the Ottoman archives in Basra, Ibn Saud received a monthly stipend of 90 liras, while Ibn Rashid was given 200 liras and 300 tons of rice. Yet Ibn Saud won a political victory that year by negotiating the withdrawal of Ottoman troops from Qasim, solidifying his control over Najd.

Meanwhile, the Rashidis turned on themselves. In 1907, Muta‘ad Ibn Rashid was murdered by his cousin, Sultan. The infighting did not stop there. Brothers and cousins fought one another for power and control.

As the Rashidis weakened, Ibn Saud’s influence spread across Najd. The Ottomans were in decline, and Britain began to reconsider its position. One official noted it might be wise “to be on friendly terms with Ibn Saud if the Ottomans were to leave the world stage.” Still, the British kept their distance. Sir Nicholas O’Conor, the ambassador in Constantinople, insisted it was best to “intervene as little as possible in the internal affairs of these tribes and let them work out their destiny as best as they can.” It would not be long before Britain had no choice but to change its approach.

On the ground, Ibn Saud’s authority was apparent. Captain Shakespear, the Acting Political Resident in Kuwait, wrote in 1913, “Since the evacuation of Qasim by the Turks in 1906... Abdulaziz has so consolidated his power that his word is law over the whole of Najd [and was] from within two days’ march of Hail to the Persian Gulf.”

By May of that year, Shakespear added, “His power in Central Arabia has increased till he no longer feared any of its Sheikhs or rulers. Moreover, he was in alliance with all of them except the Sharif of Mecca...[who] allied himself with the Turks.”

When World War I broke out, Britain’s stance had to change. London had avoided formal ties with Ibn Saud for years, but as the Ottomans joined the Central Powers, Britain needed Arabian allies. In November 1914, Ibn Saud sent a letter to the Political Resident laying out his price, “Her [HM Government] recognition of the independence of my chiefship of all the parts of Najd, El Hasa, and Katif.”

In January 1915, Ibn Saud met Captain Shakespear. From that meeting came the Treaty of Darin, in which Britain formally recognized his dominion, while Ibn Saud pledged support against the Ottomans.

Ibn Rashid chose the opposite path. He doubled down on his alliance with the Turks, isolating himself as both Ibn Saud and Sharif Hussain sided with Britain. His weakness was undeniable. That same year, he admitted, “Najd and all the interior from Al Kahaf to the valley of Duwasir... are subjects of Ibn Saud. I, Ibn Rashid, have nothing to do with them.”

Still, the Rashidis clung to Ottoman protection. Colonel Hamilton observed in 1917 that as long as the Turks held Medina and the railway, Hail could always count on them. The Rashidis also had the strength of the Shammar tribe behind them. But the balance had shifted for good.

As the Ottomans were defeated and their strongholds fell across the region, the Rashidis lost their backing. By 1922, Ibn Saud marched on Hail. Ibn Rashid fled into exile in Iraq, taking tribesmen with him. From there, they harassed Saudi towns with raids, provoking reprisals, but the dynasty was broken and would never return. The Rashidis, once the dominant power of Najd, became yet another dynasty lost to Arabia’s past.

With his greatest rival defeated, Ibn Saud’s gaze turned west to the Hashemites of the Hejaz. Their fall would be his next grand prize. The unification of Arabia was within his reach. Yet the Hashemites themselves were part of a far larger story, one that would soon stretch beyond Arabia into Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Palestine, under the shadow of the mandate system.

British India Office Records quoted in this article are licensed under the Open Government Licence v2.0.